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Abstract. The monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz for the goods 
market and the search unemployment model of Pissarides are combined The 
Pissarides part looses its Walrasian goods market and the Dixit-Stiglitz part looses its 
Walrasian labour market. Pissarides￿ results now also depend on the degree of 
competition and in the Dixit-Stiglitz part the size and number of firms as well as 
aggregate output now also depend on aggregate hiring costs, tightness and 
unemployment, and real wages are not fixed. Some partial results of comparative 
static properties of the original models survive. New results concerning the effects of 
changes in labour (goods) market parameters on goods markets (the labour market) 
variables are obtained and compared to the literature on macroeconomic theory, 
empirical results and policy issues. Keywords: Monopolistic competition, 






MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND SEARCH UNEMPLOYMENT, AND 
MACROECONOMICS 
 
Abstract. The monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz for the goods 
market and the search unemployment model of Pissarides are combined. The 
Pissarides part looses its Walrasian goods market and the Dixit-Stiglitz part looses its 
Walrasian labour market. Pissarides￿ results now also depend on the degree of 
competition and in the Dixit-Stiglitz part the size and number of firms as well as 
aggregate output now also depend on aggregate hiring costs, tightness and 
unemployment, and real wages are not fixed. Some partial results of comparative 
static properties of the original models survive. New results concerning the effects of 
changes in labour (goods) market parameters on goods markets (the labour market) 
variables are obtained and compared to the literature on macroeconomic theory, 
empirical results and policy issues. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In his theory of search unemployment Pissarides (1990) links the essentials of his 
theory to the neo-classical production function and the neo-classical growth model. In 
this paper we link Pissarides￿ theory to the monopolistic competition model of Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977).  
Many economists believe that fixed costs and product differentiation are very 
attractive features of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, which have made it a useful tool in new 
trade and growth theory, macroeconomics and regional economics. In particular, in 
economic policy debates the number and size of firms is often related to the  
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unemployment issue. However, the number and size of firms are not determined in 
models using the neo-classical production function, and search unemployment does 
not appear in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. As many economists argue, the search theory 
of unemployment has received much empirical support. It seems to be a worthwhile 
effort to link Pissarides￿ theory to the monopolistic competition model, thus joining 
two of the workhorse models in economic theory. 
Pissarides￿ model ￿ after dropping capital - can be seen as a special case of ours 
where the fixed costs of a firm are zero and marginal revenue is unity. The major new 
results of our model compared to those of Pissarides (1999, 2000) are the following: 
(i)  Marginal costs now also include expected hiring costs, which link the 
goods and the labour market. Real wages are not fixed. These are two 
major differences in comparison to the Dixit-Stiglitz model.  
(ii)  All changes of labour market parameters, which enhance the rate of 
unemployment, now also have an impact on the size of the firm and also 
on the number of firms.  
(iii)  We add comparative static results for taxes (financing unemployment 
benefits) and net wages: Increases in bargaining power and unemployment 
benefits increase gross wages as usual but also the taxes necessary to 
finance unemployment benefits because unemployment gets higher. Net 
wages may fall if increases in total unemployment benefits from this latter 
effect are larger than increases of gross wages.  
(iv)  Marginal labour productivity in Pissarides￿ model is replaced by marginal 
revenue times the marginal product of labour, because marginal revenue is 
no longer equal to the price of goods, which is the numØraire in both 
models (Marginal revenue is equal to the parameter of the constant- 
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elasticity-of-substitution utility function and its deviation from unity 
indicates the strength of monopoly power). 
(v)  Larger monopoly power yields a lower tightness ratio, lower hiring costs, 
more unemployment, higher unemployment taxes, lower gross and net 
wages. The impact on the number of firms, which is positive in the Dixit-
Stiglitz model because increased love-of-variety induces a smaller firm 
size, is now reduced by the higher unemployment and lower hiring costs. 
(vi)  A higher marginal product of labour ￿ unlike the Dixit-Stiglitz model 
where it has no impact on the number of firms ￿ now has the direct effect 
of decreasing the number of firms because marginal hiring costs are 
decreased, but increases the number of firms via a decreased probability of 
filling a vacancy, and because it yields a lower rate of unemployment.   
(vii)  Changes in the fixed costs parameter have no impact on the labour market 
and aggregate output but only on the size and number of firms.     
Other results are presented as propositions below and are summarised in 
Tables 1 and 2 and section 6. Section 5 compares the results of the model to those 
of some other macroeconomic models. Which of the results are better ￿ ours, or 
those in the literature - is an empirical question that goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
II.  The model
ii 
 
Trade in the labour market 
From the Pissarides (1990) model we use the matching function m L = m(uL, vL ), 
where L is the total number of employed and unemployed workers, u is the  
  5
unemployment rate, v is the rate of vacancies and mL is the number of matches 
produced by this function. The function is assumed to be increasing in both 
arguments, concave and linearly homogenous.
iii Defining labour market tightness as θ  
≡  v/u, division of the matching function by vL yields q(θ )= m(u/v,1) as the probability 
of a firm to find a worker for a vacancy with q￿≡  ∂ q/∂θ  < 0, and θ q(θ ) = m/u = m(1, 
v/u) as the probability of an unemployed worker to find a job. A shock is a percentage 
rate s at which (1-u)L employed workers loose their job by assumption in every 
period. Therefore s(1-u)L workers go from a job into unemployment every period. On 
the other hand θ q(θ )uL unemployed workers expect to find a job each period. A 
labour market steady state equilibrium is defined as a situation where the numbers of 
workers going into and out of unemployment are equal and expectations turn out to be 
true, i.e. s(1-u)L= θ q(θ )uL.  Solving this equation for u yields the Beveridge or UV 
curve (lower indices referring to variables indicate partial derivatives): 
 








u s      (1) 
 
Multiplying equation (1) by θ  yields an equation for the vacancy rate because 
uθ=uv/u=v: 
 








v s       (1￿) 
 
Equation (1) and (1￿) are drawn in the lower right quadrant of figure1. 
 
Government and unemployment benefits   
  6
 The government is assumed to pay unemployment benefits z to each unemployed 
worker. Total expenditures of the government for unemployment benefits are zuL. It 
will turn out that the incentives are ultimately unchanged if both the employed and the 
unemployed pay a tax or unemployment premium to finance the unemployment 
benefits. Revenue then is tL. From the balanced budget assumption we make, it 
follows that tL = zuL and therefore t = zu. Workers therefore receive w-t = w ￿ zu and 
unemployed benefits are z - t = z ￿ zu. As z is considered to be a policy variable, the 
budget equation determines the value of t, whereas u is determined in the general 
equilibrium part of the model below. Introducing the taxes explicitly allows us to 
calculate the effects of comparative static changes of all parameter changes on net 
wages in proposition seven below besides making the system of budgets explicitly 
consistent.
iv    
 
Households and workers 
















i di c,  with 0 < α  < 1, on a continuum of goods with index i, ranging from 
zero to n, the (integral measure of) the number of firms.
v The market for goods is 
assumed to have no search frictions. It is well known that this specification of 
preferences leads to a constant elasticity of the inverse demand function, α -1, and to 
relative demand of goods independent of the income earned by employed or 
unemployed persons. If the temporary utility function is discounted and integrated we 
may get an inter-temporal utility function for which it is well known from endogenous 
growth theory or the theory of optimal growth that, in the absence of a rate of 
permanent productivity growth, the steady-state value of consumption will be  
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stationary and the interest rate will equal the discount rate. This seems to be the 
shortest way to determine the interest rate.
vi The problem of a household with an 
infinite time horizon then is to choose the values of ci and of savings such that the 
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& and W(0)= W0 ≥ 0, where W is current wealth, a dot indicates a 
time derivative, r is the interest rate, pi is the price of good i, and current non-interest 
income is I = (1-u) w + uz - t. The assumption here is that a household gets the wage 
w with probability (1-u) and is unemployed and gets benefits z with probability u, but 
pays taxes t in both cases. As the utility function exhibits risk neutrality there are no 
complications from the uncertainty. A second interpretation could be that every 
household is representative in the sense that the same share 1-u (u) of its members is 
(un-) employed as in the total labour force of the economy.
vii  In the first 
interpretation the (ex-post) employed workers lend money to (ex-post) unemployed 
workers allowing the latter to smooth consumption under the assumption of a perfect 
capital market. In the second interpretation this happens within the households and 
lending among identical households must be zero in equilibrium. In the appendix we 
show that the inverse price elasticity is α  - 1 and the interest rate in a steady state with 
a constant number of firms is r = ρ . All results henceforth are steady-state results. 
 
The present value, discounted at rate r, of the expected income stream of an 
unemployed and an employed worker, U and E respectively, are: U = [z - zu + 
θ q(θ )(E-U)]/r and E=[w ￿ zu + s(U-E)]/r. E-U is the income difference an 
unemployed worker can gain by finding a job with probability θ q(θ ). U-E is the  
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corresponding loss by a worker from losing his job with probability s. These two 
equations can be solved for E and U explicitly: 
 
  r zu r
q s r
w q z s r
U / /
) (
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q s r













The present-discounted value of a vacancy is V = [-γ +q(θ )(J-V)]/r . It consists of the 
hiring costs γ  and the net return of transferring the vacancy V into a job with value J 
expected with probability q(θ ).  r is the discount rate. As the value of the vacancy is 
zero in equilibrium, we get J = γ / q(θ ): the value of a job is equal to the vacant job 
costs γ  multiplied by the expected duration of the vacancy. When considering the 
firms￿ hiring costs we must consider that the occupied job may be separated from the 
worker again with probability s. The current value of the expected value of a job 
therefore is (r + s)J = (r + s)γ  /q(θ ). These are labour costs that are added to the real 
wage received by the worker. Labour costs then equal w + (r + s)γ  /q(θ ). Pissarides 
(1990) links the above to the neo-classical production function.
viii Here we link it to 
the model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  
Technologies are defined by li = f + a xi , with a, f > 0. The left side represents 
demand for labour to produce good i, f is the fixed part and axi is the variable part of 
labour demand, where xi is the output of a firm. As all goods are assumed to be 
identical in the utility function and in the production technology, their prices and 
quantities will be the same.   
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Total labour demand is nli =n(f + a xi). Equating this to the employment (1-
u)L yields (1-u)L= nli = n( f + a xi ). Solving the latter equation we find the rate of 
unemployment linked to the number of firms as: 
 
() L ax f n L L nl L u i i / )] ( [ / + − = − =      (2) 
 
There is a partial negative relation between the rate of unemployment and the number 
of firms: The larger the number of firms, the lower the unemployment rate (ceteris 
paribus), or the lower the unemployment rate the more firms can be in the market. 
The interesting question to be answered below is whether a higher number of firms 
induces a lower rate of unemployment or the causality goes the other way around.  
Present-discounted value of the firm￿s expected profits
ix, which has a current 
value of zero in every period in equilibrium, are defined in nominal terms as: 
 
Π i = 0∫ 
∞  e
-rt { p(xi)xi -W ( f + a xi ) - pγ Vi }dt     (3) 
 
W is the nominal wage rate and real hiring costs for vacancies, γ Vi, are made nominal 
by multiplying their real value with the price. The assumption is that nominal hiring 
costs are given from the labour market; monopoly pricing then has no impact on the 
value of hiring costs.  The firm maximizes profits as defined in equation (3) through 
choice of the quantity x and the number of vacancies Vi using the dynamic concept of 
the large firm from Pissarides (2000, chap.3). The dynamics comes from the fact that 
the firm can post a number of Vi vacancies, which increase employment with  
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probability q(θ ) and costs pγ Vi.  On the other hand, the firm looses workers sli. The 
expected change in employment then is  i i i sl V q l − = ) (θ & .  From li = f + axi and dli = a 
dxi we get the corresponding change in the quantity as  
 
) / ( / ) ( x a f s a V q x i + − = θ &  
 
The current value Hamiltonian for each firm￿s decision problem then is: 
 
)] / ( / ) ( [ ) ( ) ( x a f s a V q V p ax f W x x p i i i i + − + − + − = Η θ λ γ  
 
The first-order condition for the number of vacancies determines the value of the co-
state variable as marginal hiring costs:  
 
) ( / , , 0 / ) ( / θ γ λ θ λ γ q pa or a q p Vi = = + − = ∂ Η ∂  
 
The other canonical equation is  
 
λ λ λ r s aW p x p x − = − − + − = ∂ Η ∂ − & } ’ { / 
 
Insertion of λ  from the previous first-order condition and setting its change 
equal to zero in the steady state, and noticing that the price elasticity p￿x/p=α -1 this 
latter first-order condition yields
x: 
 
)] ( / ) ( [ θ γ α q s r p W a p + + =      (4)  
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In the steady state the change of employment also must be zero and therefore we get 
the number of vacancies as a function of the quantity produced: 
 
Vi= s(f + ax)/q(θ )         (5)  
    
The solution for the quantity and the tightness ratio will be derived below.  
 
Wages 
There are two sorts of rents in Pissarides￿ model: on occupied jobs, indexed j, 
employed workers do not have to search and therefore have an income rent of Ej - U 
and firms do not have to incur hiring costs and therefore have a rent Jj-V. Bargaining 
these rents is assumed to determine real wages. This is done by choosing the real 
wage by maximising the function (Ej-U)
β (Jj-V)
1-β  with β  as the bargaining power of 
workers and 1-β  that of firms, V=0, Ej=[wj ￿ zu + sU]/(r+s), U according to the 
explicit solution given above, and Jj= γ  /q(θ )= (α /a- wj)/(r+s) where the last equality 
stems from the solution of (4) for expected hiring costs.  E, U and V are as in 
Pissarides (1990). The value for J differs from Pissarides￿ model because we have 
replaced the neoclassical production function by elements of the Dixit-Stiglitz model: 
as we have increasing returns on the firm level, the value of an occupied job is the 
present-discounted value not of the average but rather the marginal profit from a 
worker gross of hiring costs. The result of the maximisation with respect to the real 
wage in its general form is identical to that of Pissarides in that workers get a share β  
of the sum of the rents to be distributed: Ej-U = β (Ej-U + Jj-V). Insertion of the values 





zu rU w j
α
β β + + − = ) )( 1 (  
 
Insertion of Ej-U = β (Jj-V)/(1-β ) from the general form of the bargaining result and 
J=γ /q(θ ) into rU = [z - zu + θ q(θ )(E-U)] yields rU = z - zu +θβγ /(1-β ). Insertion of 












z w j ) 1 (     (6) 
 
The last term indicates that workers participate in the hiring costs saved on occupied 
jobs compared to vacancies. The second but last term is net revenue per worker as in 
Pissarides (1990) - where the output-per-worker term is f(k) ￿ (r+δ )k -, but here 
without capital cost as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. The unemployment tax, zu, has 
dropped out only in the very last step of the calculation yielding (6). This shows that 
the Pissarides approach is consistent with an explicit financing scheme for the 
unemployment benefit if both unemployed and employed workers have the same 
reduction of their gross payments w and z respectively. Then the difference of going 
from a status of unemployed to employed workers is unchanged and incentives of 
benefits are exactly as in Pissarides￿ model. This equation is drawn as the BB curve in 
the upper right quadrant of Figure 1.   
  This model is kept as simple as the basic workhorse models were. We resist 
the temptation to endogenize the bargaining power parameter, or distinguish between 
the love-of-variety and the price elasticity parameters, or endogenize the mark-up. 
These and other extensions can be taken on board when applications require doing so.    
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III.  The equilibrium solution: Existence and uniqueness 
 
Equations (1)-(6) ￿ with the index j dropped because we consider the general 
equilibrium now - determine the six variables of the model when goods produced 
serve as numØraire (p=1): Vi, u, n, x, θ  and w. Inserting (5) for the number of 
vacancies into (3), equations (3), (4) and (6) can be solved for x, w and θ ; then (1) 
determines u and (2) determines n. Insertion of wages per worker from (4) and the 
number of vacancies into the current profit function contained in (3) allows to solve 
for the zero-profit
xiii- equilibrium quantity: 
 






















x        ( 7 )  
 
Using equation (7) we can calculate the labour demand per firm as  
 















Both, output and labour demand depend negatively on hiring costs via the probability 
q(θ ) because an increase in the tightness ratio increases expected marginal hiring 
costs. Each firm knows that it will be separated from the worker with probability s, 
resulting in sli separations, and can fill a vacancy with probability q(θ ). A flow 
equilibrium of the firm - allowing the firm to keep the labour demand, which allows 
producing the profit maximizing output level - then requires that expected separations  
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equal expected hiring, sli = q(θ )Vi. The number of vacancies the firm will post to 




Vi = f[s /q(θ )]/[1-α  +arγ /q(θ )]      ( 8 )  
 
The equilibrium output quantity of the model is directly dependent of the labour-
market parameters r and γ  and indirectly on all those having an impact on the 
tightness ratio stemming from Pissarides￿ part of the model (unemployment benefit z, 
hiring costs γ , unemployment rate u, vacancies v, separation rate s, power parameter β  
and interest r; see below). Clearly, this result is due to the fact that the firm part of the 
Dixit-Stiglitz model is changed by adding hiring costs (per vacancies actually filled) 
to the wage rate: these terms, the wage and the expected hiring costs constitute 
marginal costs and therefore have an impact on the quantity, the employment and the 
vacancies posted.  





) ( / 1
) 1 (
θ γ α + −
− =    (2￿) 
 
This is a function n(θ ). A higher tightness ratio increases expected hiring costs, 
decreases the firm size and the unemployment rate and therefore increases the number 
of firms. Aggregate output can be found by multiplying the solutions for the output 
and the number of firms, equations (7) and (2￿):  
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nx = (1-u)L[α /a - rγ /q(θ )] 
 
Although there are internal economies of scale on the firm level, aggregate output has 
constant returns in the size of the economy L, and employment L(1-u) for a given 
tightness ratio. An increase in the marginal value product of labour, dα /a < 0, 
increases nx directly because it appears in the numerator but will be shown below to 
have an indirect impact on the tightness ratio, hiring costs and the unemployment rate. 
Using the result for the number of firms from equation (2￿), we can calculate the total 
number of vacancies from equation (8) as vL = n Vi = n(s/q)li  = (s/q)L(1-u). 
Cancelling L and dividing by (1-u) yields v/(1-u) = s/q = θ u/(1-u). This equation 
corresponds to equation (3.14) in Pissarides and can be re-transformed into equation 
(1) by solving for u.   
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium quantity and employment of the firm, the total number 
of firms and vacancies as well as aggregate output of the modified Dixit-Stiglitz 
model are all dependent on marginal hiring costs, which link it to the labour market 
variables via the tightness ratio. 
 
To solve the system the next steps serve to get a second equation ￿ besides (6) ￿ 
relating the real wage and the tightness ratio. Dividing (4) by the price and solving for 










− =        ( 4 ￿ )  
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Larger hiring costs (r+s)γ /q(θ ) imply lower wages according to (4￿) as in Pissarides￿ 
model when interest is given. Here the model resembles Pissarides￿ because the zero-
profit condition in his model implies constant labour costs as long as r = f￿(k)-δ  and 
therefore k are constant. By implication wages w always move in the opposite 
direction of hiring costs, (r+s)γ /q(θ ), in Pissarides￿ model and in ours.
xv  Equation (4￿) 
is drawn as a function w(θ ) in the upper right quadrant of figure 1, indicated as the 
MM curve. The MM curve is rotated downward by increases in r, s and γ , and shifted 
downward by decreases of α /a. It is also drawn in the upper left quadrant of figure 1 
with wages as a function of hiring costs. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE 
 
The intersection of lines BB and MM determines the wage and the tightness rate in 
the upper right quadrant, and hiring costs in the upper left quadrant. Given the rate of 
tightness thus determined, the solution for the rates of unemployment and vacancies 
can be found in the lower right quadrant.  























z a      (9) 
 
The left side is marginal revenue and the right side is marginal cost. In figure 2 both 
functions are drawn. The left side is denoted as MR and the right side as MC in figure 




INSERT FIGURE 2 OVER HERE 
 
The MC curve starts at az if θ =0 and lim θ→ 0 q= lim m(1/θ , 1)= lim 
m(∞ ,1)=∞ ; otherwise it starts above az. As θ  goes to infinity the MC curve also goes 
to infinity. Thus, the MC curve either intersects once or not at all. Therefore we have 
a unique or no equilibrium.  
 
Proposition 2: The existence of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed if z < α /a. 
This implies a positive equilibrium value for the tightness ratio v/u=θ . The fixed cost 
parameter f and the size of the economy, L, have no impact on the value of v/u=θ .  
 
If, however, z ≥  α /a, the tightness ratio is zero, there are no vacancies and 
unemployment is 100% according to equation (2). With no output, z cannot be paid.  
Therefore this cannot be an equilibrium situation.   
 
IV.  Comparative static analysis 
 
All comparative static changes could be done using Figure 1. However, this treatment, 
although preferable in classroom teaching with extensive interpretations, takes more 
space than the one used below.  
The following changes in the determinants of labour costs drive up the MC 
curve on the RHS of equation (9), but leave the MR curve unchanged: dβ >0, dγ >0, 
dr>0, dz>0, ds>0. This decreases the value of the tightness ratio in figure 2. The UV 
equation (1), drawn as u(θ ) in the lower right quadrant of figure 1, shifted to higher u 
in case of ds>0, then implies that the rate of unemployment goes up. When labour  
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market parameters are changed in this model, the causality goes from tightness and 
employment to the number of firms - not the other way around as is often hoped for in 
justifications for policies based on the impression that having more firms implies 
getting more employment.
xviii      
For a given z, all increases of unemployment require more unemployment 
benefits, zuL. As all persons pay the tax zu, this is increased whenever the rate of 
unemployment is increased. If the benefit z is increased too, there is a second reason 
for getting a higher tax rate.   
From (1￿), which does not contain β  and z, we can conclude that increased 
bargaining power and unemployment benefits lead to less vacancies because of the 
fall in the tightness ratio. In figure 1 this can be seen as only the BB curve shifts (for 
dz) and also rotates upward (for dβ ) but all other curves do not change their position. 
This leads to higher wages and lower hiring costs. The size of firms is increased 
through lower hiring costs and the number of firms is going down because of the 
higher rate of unemployment and the lower hiring costs.  
In the upper right quadrant of figure 1, increasing the rate of interest and the 
strength of separation shocks rotates the MM curve downward and leaves the BB 
curve unchanged. We can conclude that increasing the rate of interest decrease wages 
and the tightness ratio.
xix The impact on the size and number of firms remains unclear, 
because the decrease in the tightness ratio decreasing hiring costs increases firm size, 
but the increase in the interest rate has the direct effect of decreasing firm size.  
The impact of the change in hiring costs, dγ >0, is to decrease tightness 
according to (9) and vacancies according to (1￿). In terms of Figure 1 it rotates the 
MM curve downward and increases the slope for the BB curve. Its effect on wages 
depends on the strength of these two movements. In equations (4￿) and (6) γ  and θ   
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have opposite effects on wages. In equation (6) the question is whether γθ  is 
increasing or decreasing.  Applying the implicit function rule to (9) and dividing by θ  
and multiplying by γ  yields  
 
() ()
() ( ) βγθ θ γ
β θ γ γ
γ γ
θ θ













The numerator and the denominator have identical terms up to -qθ θ /q.
 xx This term is 
smaller than one
xxi. By implication the percentage decrease of θ  is larger in absolute 
terms than the increase of γ , leading to a fall in wages according to (6). In terms of 
figure 1 this means that the upward rotation of BB is weaker than the downward 
rotation of MM.  
 
Proposition 3: With increases in worker￿s bargaining power β , hiring costs γ , the 
discount rate r and unemployment benefits z and the size of shocks s we confirm 
Pissarides￿ results of decreasing tightness and expected hiring costs and increasing 
unemployment. Wage rates go up with bargaining power and benefits and go down 
when interest and separation rates or hiring costs increase. We add the following 
results: (i) Lower employment requires an increasing unemployment tax or premium. 
(ii) There is an increasing size and a decreasing number of firms from increasing 
bargaining power, benefits and separation rates with unclear effects on aggregate 
output. (iii) Increases in hiring costs γ  and interest rates r have direct effects on the 
number and size of firms and aggregate output, which are opposite to those of the 
decreasing tightness ratio and lead to no clear results for these variables.      
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Changes in fixed costs, df <0, which is one of two possible versions of 
exogenous productivity increases, do not change the tightness ratio and therefore the 
unemployment and vacancy rates, and marginal labour costs are unchanged.
xxii Firm 
size x is decreased and the number of firms is increased as in Dixit-Stiglitz. Aggregate 
output, nx, is unaffected.  
  A decrease in marginal costs via da<0, decreases the slope and intercept of the 
MC curve in figure 2 and shifts up the MM curve in figure 1. The result is a larger 
value for the tightness ratio, v/u=θ . This reduces the unemployment rate and increases 
the rate of vacancies according to equation (1) and (1￿). The direct impact is to 
decrease the number of firms and increase its size and aggregate output. However, the 
indirect effect through larger tightness is to increase hiring costs: This decreases firm 
size and aggregate output and increases the number of firms. Moreover, a lower 
unemployment rate increases the number of firms and aggregate output. Wages are 
increased according to equation (6).  
 
Proposition 4: (i) Productivity increases in the fixed cost parameter, df<0, when we 
leave labour market variables unchanged, decrease the size of firms while increasing 
the number of firms as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model. Aggregate output, however, is 
unchanged. (ii) Pissarides￿ productivity results appear in our model and are caused 
by a decrease in the variable labour demand parameter, da<0. Wages, tightness and 
employment increase. The number and size of firms and aggregate output do not have 
clear effects anymore as they did in Dixit-Stiglitz because unemployment and hiring 
costs change with the tightness ratio.  
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By implication, policies that try to enhance the number of firms in order to decrease 
unemployment should - according to this model with a constant elasticity of 
substitution - not try to reduce fixed costs of firms but rather variable costs, or, the 
personal fixed costs of entrepreneurs for setting up a firm according to the model of 
Fonseca et al. (2001).  
A decrease in love-of-variety, dα >0, which means that the elasticity of 
substitution is getting larger in absolute terms and competition is increased, shifts up 
the MR curve in figure 2 and the MM curve in figure 1. The tightness ratio and 
expected hiring costs increase, the unemployment rate falls and the number of 
vacancies goes up.
 xxiii  Wages increase according to (6). Firm size grows through the 
direct effect but decreases through the increase in expected hiring costs according to 
(6).
 The effect on the number of firms is ambiguous because the direct effect is 
decreasing the number of firms whereas the indirect effects via the rate of 
unemployment and expected hiring costs are increasing the number of firms. This 
latter aspect is analysed formally in an appendix for the case of constant hiring costs 
and summarized at the end of the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 5: A preference induced increase in substitution and competition 
increases employment, the tightness ratio and wages. Unlike the Dixit-Stiglitz model, 
the effect on the number is ambiguous even for a negligible change in hiring costs: a 
decrease in monopoly power dα  >0 decreases (increases) the number of firms if the 
measure of scale economies is larger (smaller) than the elasticity of employment with 
respect to monopoly power. The size of firms and aggregate output are increased if 
the increase in hiring costs is sufficiently weak. 
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For the decrease of unemployment through a higher degree of competition, dα >0, an 
increase in the number of firms is inessential. What matters are the larger marginal 
revenue and the larger marginal value product of labour, which increases labour 
demand.  
A transition from monopolistic to perfect competition can be made by setting 
fixed costs f=0 and removing product differentiation setting α =1. This increases the 
tightness ratio and vacancies and decreases unemployment. By implication 
unemployment is lower under perfect competition than under monopolistic 
competition.
xxiv  
Integrating two identical economies doubles L. This leaves the tightness ratio, 
the rates of unemployment and vacancies unchanged. The number of firms and 
varieties is doubled as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model and so are the number of 
unemployed workers and vacant jobs, uL and vL.  
 
Proposition 6: Doubling the size of the market doubles the number of firms, the 
number of unemployed people and the number of vacant jobs, but leaves the rate of 
unemployment unchanged. Doubling the number of varieties is a gain from trade and 
integration of two economies.  
 
All changes in parameters inducing the above comparative static results have 
to be interpreted as stemming from perfectly non-anticipated shocks that are expected 
to be permanent with probability one because the Pissarides part of the model uses 
steady-state present values.
xxv 
The economic mechanism of causation (in the sense of finding the solution of 
the model) of the comparative-static changes as summarised in Figure 1 always goes  
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from the exogenous change to its impact on real wages, hiring costs and the tightness 
ratio and from there to the rate of unemployment and the number of firms.  
Changes in the fixed cost parameter have no impact on aggregate output.  The 
positive cross-country correlation of employment changes and start ups found by 
Fonseca et al. (2001, Fig.4) therefore may have a two way causality: on the one hand 
it is plausible that countries with a lower start-up cost index have more start ups and 
therefore lower unemployment; on the other hand it may also be the case that changes 
in productivity and competition, dα /a, and labour market parameters did reduce the 
rate of unemployment and thereby did increase the number of firms.  
The results of this section are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first four columns of table 1 clearly show that Pissarides￿ results for parameter 
changes in the labour market carry over to our model. The fifth column adds results 
concerning the number of firms added by this model: Whenever unemployment is 
increased, the number of firms is decreased unless there are dominant offsetting 
effects from interest and expected hiring costs. The sixth column indicates that firm 
size increases when tightness decreases, but direct effects from increases of interest r 
and hiring costs γ  may be stronger. Finally, the change of the unemployment tax or 
premium has the same sign as the change of the unemployment rate.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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In Table 2 the column for wages is qualitatively exactly the same as in Dixit-Stiglitz, 
but real wages now depend also on hiring cost and the effects therefore differ in 
quantity. The first three columns summarize the effects of goods market parameters 
from the Dixit-Stiglitz model on the labour market variables. These are the new 
results: Country size and fixed costs have no impact on labour market variables; 
increasing monopoly power increases unemployment and decreases tightness and the 
number of vacancies. The results for marginal productivity are the same as those of 
Pissarides for productivity, and country size also had no impact on the solution of his 
perfect competition model. The column concerning the number of firms has different 
results from Dixit-Stiglitz concerning marginal costs and marginal revenue because 
the impact via the unemployment rate and hiring costs changes their results because 
the direct effect dα /a> 0 increases the size of the firm which has a negative effect on 
the number of firms and increases employment, which has a positive impact on the 
number of firms. Moreover, hiring costs change. Aggregate output is increased by 
dα /a> 0 unless hiring costs increase too much. The last column adds results from the 
unemployment tax or premium t, which again follows those of the unemployment rate 
u.  
Liu and Yang (1999) observe that there is declining average size 
(employment) of the firm, growth of per capita income and productivity in the data of 
some countries. If recent shifts of parameters are assumed to be dα  > 0, because of an 
increase in competition, da < 0 and df < 0, both because of productivity 
improvements, our model generates exactly these observed changes if the change in 
the fixed costs dominates the others in regard to the number and size of firms.
xxvi       
   In regard to net wages, w-zu, we can say that they will be increased whenever 
gross wages are increased and unemployment is decreased, that is, by lower hiring  
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costs γ , interest rates r, separation rates s and marginal costs a, and by higher α , i.e. 
lower monopoly power. These results follow directly from the definition of net wages 
and the results in the tables. The impact of changes in bargaining power β  and 
benefits z are more difficult to get. We show the following results in an appendix.  
 
Proposition 7: An increase in bargaining power β  increases (decreases) net wages if 
the effect of the induced decrease of the tightness ratio increases unemployment 
multiplied by constant benefits less than it decreases rents from expected hiring costs. 
An increase in benefits z decreases net wages if (sufficient) the induced decrease of 
the tightness ratio (multiplied by initial benefits) increases unemployment more than 
it decreases rents from expected hiring costs.   
 
V.  A comparison with some macroeconomic models 
 
Table 3 summarizes literature on imperfect competition and non-monetary
xxvii 
theories of unemployment, which comes closest to our contribution. The first column 
lists models of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. Unemployment in this column is based on 
pessimistic expectations in Weitzman (1985) and Dutt and Sen (1997). In Weinrich 
(1993), using the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) variant of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, 
unemployment is based on the use of an effort function that is continuous in wages 
and unemployment. In Matusz (1996, 1998) it is based on the Shapiro-Stiglitz model 
of efficiency wages. In deGroot and van Schaik (1998, 2000) dual labour markets 
with unemployment arise because of an efficiency wage relation.  In de Groot (2001) 
dual labour markets arise because of union bargaining. The last model mentioned in 
the first column of the table is the focus of this paper.   
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the second column, models with other forms of monopolistic competition 
than that of the Chamberlain-Dixit-Stiglitz type are listed. Weitzman (1982) uses a 
Hotelling model and unemployment is based on pessimistic expectations of the self-
fulfilling prophecy type. Br￿uninger (2000) considers unemployment based on 
bargaining. Bargaining is about profits and rents from being employed. Unlike the 
Pissarides model there are no hiring costs creating rents for firms but rather ￿ unlike 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model - profits are positive because the model has no entry but 
rather a large, exogenous number of firms and no fixed costs. Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2000) in a similar set up have fixed costs and also consider entry. There have been 
other attempts to relate search unemployment and monopolistic competition in the 
literature. One group of attempts is related to the Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998 
chap.4) quality ladders approach. In that approach there is vertical product 
differentiation; each firm has the exogenous size of one worker and because 
unemployment is endogenous the number of firms is also endogenous, whereas in our 
approach both, the number and the size of firms, are endogenous. We use the Dixit-
Stiglitz approach of horizontal differentiation because it has an endogenous number 
and size of firms. Bean and Pissarides (1993) adjust the Pissarides (1990) model to an 
overlapping-generations growth model by fixing the employment duration to last one 
period. Bean and Pissarides then go to analyse the effect of savings shocks on 
employment and growth; this topic is not considered here. In their model, firms play 
Cournot in each of the markets for differentiated products. Table 3 indicates which  
  27
gap in the literature this paper fills: combining the search model of the labour market 
with the goods market model of Dixit-Stiglitz.  
  In this paper, we did investigate to what degree the solution of the model and 
the comparative static results of Pissarides (1990) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) are 
unchanged and which results on the number and size of firms and real wages can be 
added. We limit our comparison with the literature to that of other static models. 
Results from literature that uses either a different theory of unemployment or a 
different model of monopolistic competition can be compared with our results more 
straightforwardly. 
There are two qualifications concerning our result that decreasing fixed costs 
have no impact on the rate of tightness and unemployment. First, Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2000) show in a framework without matching imperfections and hiring 
costs, that the increase in the (integral measure of) the number of firms obtained from 
the fixed costs reduction decreases unemployment if the CES parameter, which is also 
the degree of competition, changes with the number of firms. However, if that number 
of firms is large - as is the assumption built into the continuum of goods in the Dixit-
Stiglitz model ￿ the model does not have this effect. The question then is, which 
model is best representing the macro economy. Second, fixed personal start-up costs 
of people becoming entrepreneurs may have an impact on the unemployment rate 
according to Fonseca et al. (2001). Policy therefore should focus on these fixed 
personal start-up costs or on variable costs.  
Matusz (1998) has linked the Dixit-Stiglitz model to efficiency-wage 
unemployment of the Shapiro-Stiglitz type. In the non-shirking constraint the number 
of varieties appears. Therefore country size or international trade, increasing the 
market size and yielding more variety, relaxes the non-shirking constraint. By  
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implication the unemployment needed to deter shirking is lower. In Matusz (1996) an 
increase in market size increases productivity because of an increased number of 
intermediate products, which allows for higher wages and less equilibrium 
unemployment again via a non-shirking constraint. In this paper we find no market 
size effects of international trade on the unemployment percentage rate for several 
reasons. First, with differentiated consumer goods in our model the productivity effect 
of Matusz (1996) is absent in our set up. Second, having no non-shirking constraint in 
the Pissarides part of our model, variety cannot have such a prominent role in relation 
to unemployment as it has in Matusz (1998). Two other channels - discussed verbally 
by Matusz (1996) ￿ which might in principal affect the rate of unemployment, are 
also absent here. First, the price elasticity of demand in his model as in ours is 
independent of the number of firms. If it were dependent on the number of firms as it 
is in models with strategic interaction, entry induced by larger market size might 
affect firms￿ size and decrease average cost, which might be (similar to) a 
productivity effect. However, it needs a proof to see the interaction of market size, 
firms￿ size, productivity and unemployment. Second, if there were an impact of more 
variety on the search intensity, the rate of unemployment might be affected. In our set 
up following Pissarides (1990) this effect is absent because the bargaining is on 
income and not on utility, and the utility function and the Nash-product are specified 
independently of each other. These channels are also not modelled here because there 
is hardly any empirical indication that they are relevant. I agree with Matusz that it is 
an empirical question whether or not these channels matter quantitatively. 
In the models by Matusz the size of the firms equals that of the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model and therefore is independent of the rate of unemployment whereas our model  
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has larger hiring costs when steady-state unemployment is lower and therefore the 
size of firms is lower.  
Concerning an increase in worker bargaining power Dutt and Sen (1997) find a 
different result in a demand-constrained model of monopolistic competition cum 
unemployment of the Weitzman (1985) type. In their model bargaining power raises 
wage rates. As workers save less than profit earners, demand is increased and so is 
employment. The authors show that the result can neither be proven nor rejected if a 
decreasing marginal product of labour exists. Unlike Dutt and Sen (1997) we do not 
find that increased bargaining power of unions increases demand and therefore 
employment. The reason is that our model, unlike the Weitzman (1985) type of model 
used by Dutt and Sen, is not demand constrained via pessimistic expectations and 
allows for real-wage flexibility and entry. 
In the model by Pissarides (1990) the neo-classical way to get full employment 
with decreasing real wage costs is blocked by search frictions. In most monopolistic 
competition models without hiring costs this road is absent anyway because real 
wages are fixed as in (4) (see Weitzman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), 
Matusz (1996, 1998). The Dixit-Stiglitz road to full employment used to be entry 
whenever profits are positive, according to equation (2) with u=0. In Weitzman 
(1982) u>0 comes in exogenously via the assumption that firms expect aggregate 
demand to be (in symbols of our model) u
ewL, where all the three variables are given 
exogenously. With this expected demand, a self-fulfilling prophecy yields the 
unemployment rate u=u
e >0. In our model, however, the Dixit-Stiglitz road to full-
employment is present but limited by Pissarides￿ search friction, resulting in an 
endogenous value of unemployment u > 0 incorporated in equation (2).   
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In Weitzman (1982) the rate of unemployment is negatively related to real wages: 
if the (expected) rate of unemployment goes up real wages decrease, because lower 
expected demand moves the firm up its average cost curve. This is interpreted as a 
pro-cyclical movement of real wages. In our model a positive or a negative relation 
may exist depending on the reason that drives up wages: if the exogenous change in 
question increases (decreases) tightness the unemployment rate goes down (up). For 
example, an increase in the rate of interest or the separation rate, which decreases 
tightness and wages and increases unemployment, yields a negative relation as in 
Weitzman￿s model. On the other hand, an increase in unemployment benefit z or 
bargaining power β  increases wages, decreases the tightness ratio and increases 
unemployment. A similar negative relation w(u) can be found in Weinrich (1993) 
based on a linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas effort function that generates 
constant effort. On this relation u is determined through the use of an equation similar 
to our equation (4￿), which fixes the real wage in the absence of hiring costs (see 
Weinrich 1993, p.545). Moving the latter equation along the former would result in a 
negative relation between w and u. Specific combinations of parameter shifts could 
also generate a positive relation between w and u in the comparative static manner in 
our model. In our model there is no fixed wage.      
With the exception of Vogt (1996) all the other static monopolistic competition 
models mentioned above do not take hiring costs into account. Vogt has criticised 
monopolistic competition models because of their property to translate wage increases 
completely into price increases (see Weitzman (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), Matusz (1996, 1998)) for empirical reasons. He develops a potential 
competition model in which sunk costs deter entry of a potential Bertrand competitor 
resulting in a demand curve with a kink at a limit price. This ensures that prices,  
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quantity and employment are independent of cost increases within certain limits. In 
this paper, the problem is avoided by introducing search unemployment into a model 
of monopolistic competition. Our combination of the models by Pissarides and Dixit-
Stiglitz generates another, though less strict, separation of wages from prices because 
costs, price and employment are still interdependent. Wage increases can either 
increase prices or decrease hiring costs as in Pissarides (1990).  
Our model has higher employment under perfect than under monopolistic 
competition because the marginal value product of labour is larger. In Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) this result is achieved by an aggregate demand externality based on 
real balances in the utility function and endogenous labour supply. 
 
VI.  Summary and conclusion 
 
Linking Pissarides￿ (1990) search theory of unemployment to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) 
model rather than to the neo-classical production function yields six groups of results. 
First, the rates of tightness is linked to the size of firms via expected hiring costs and 
via the  rate of unemployment also to the number firms. Every variable that has an 
impact on the rate of unemployment and hiring costs also has an impact on the 
number and size of firms. Thus, aggregate output is affected via the number and size 
of firms.  
Second, the introduction of love-of-variety preferences has an impact as well. 
A decrease in the love-of-variety parameter, α, decreases the elasticity of substitution 
and competition, decreases marginal revenue and the tightness ratio, increases 
unemployment and hiring costs, decreases vacancies and wages and - deviating from 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model - has an ambiguous effect on the number of firms. It also  
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decreases the size of the firms unless the decrease in hiring costs increases the size of 
firms. By implication employment is higher under perfect than under monopolistic 
competition. 
Third, some other comparative static results of Pissarides￿ model and the 
model of Dixit and Stiglitz survive. However, as the equilibrium quantity of firms 
now depends on marginal hiring costs changes of interest and hiring cost parameters 
have unclear effects on the size and number of firms. Similarly, increases in the 
marginal value product of labour would increase the size and decrease the number of 
firms but the new effect of hiring costs on the size and number of firm can invalidate 
this result if changes in hiring costs are large. By implication the introduction of 
hiring costs in both cases decreases wages received by workers. 
Four, decreases in bargaining power or benefits decrease gross wages but do 
not necessarily decrease net wages because the resultant decrease in unemployment ￿ 
if it is sufficiently strong - may increase them. 
Five, unlike earlier monopolistic competition models, real wages have some 
flexibility because of the hiring costs depending on the rate of tightness. The model 
allows for a negative or a positive relation between real wages and the rate of 
unemployment. The negative relation occurs provided the shocks come from hiring 
costs, interest and separation rates, the CES parameter or the marginal cost parameter. 
The positive relation occurs when there is variation in bargaining power and benefits.       
Finally, the fixed cost parameter has no impact on the solution for the 
tightness ratio and other labour market variables and influences only the size and 
number of firms, but not aggregate output. Doubling market size doubles the number 
of firms, and the number but not the rate of unemployed workers and vacant jobs. It  
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increases the gains from trade only via variety. Increases in marginal productivity 
increase employment but have an ambiguous effect on the number and size of firms.  
  The Pissarides-Dixit-Stiglitz model of this paper has the desirable properties 
of both its underlying models, and also some which have been stated as desirable in 
macroeconomics such as flexible real wages and the size of firm being dependent on 
the steady-state level of activity, unemployment and tightness. The combination of the 
basic models yields some new results as well such as the dependence of the number 
and size of firms on the activity indicators of the economy such as the rates of 
tightness and unemployment. Moreover, it is simple enough to allow for extensions in 
many directions. One of the possible extensions is to introduce energy-input 
coefficients and treat the issues of environmental policy under endogenous 
unemployment. A second possible extension is to treat information and 
communication technology as technical progress in the matching function and as a 
decrease of the variable labour-cost coefficient at the cost of increasing the parameter 
for fixed costs. A third one is to derive the central planners optimum without and with 
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Table 1  Comparative static results of labour market parameters  
 
Effect on → tightness  θ  unempl. u.  vac. v wage w firms n size x premium t 
from increases of ↓ 
 
Bargaining power β  - +    - +  - +  + 
  
Hiring costs γ    - +    - - ? ? + 
 
Interest  rate  r    - +    - - ? ? + 
 
Benefit  z    - +    - +  - +  + 
 






































Table 2 Comparative static results of goods market parameters 
 
Effect on →tightness θ, unempl. u, vac. v,  firms n, wage w, size x, outp. nx, prem t 
from increases of ↓ 
 
Fixed  costs  f    0 0 0 - 0 + 0 0 
 
Marginal  costs  a  - +  - ? - ? ? + 
 
Marginal revenue α  + -  + ? + ? ? - 
 











Table 3  Theories of unemployment and imperfect competition. 
Imperfect competition:  Dixit-Stiglitz   others 
(Un)employment theory 
 
Pessimistic expectations  Weitzman 1985  Weitzman 1982 
    Dutt/Sen  1997 
 
Walrasian labour market  Blanchard/Kiyotaki 
    1987 
Effort  function    Weinrich  1993   
 
reservation wage 
cum  hiring  costs      Vogt  1996   
  
Shapiro-Stiglitz    Matusz 1996, 1998 
 
Dual labour market    de Groot/ v.Schaik 
(1998, 2000), de Groot 
 (2001) 




Search  models    This  paper   Aghion/Howitt  1998 
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Figure 2. Marginal revenue, MR at value α , is equal to 
marginal cost, MC. The intersection of both lines determines 
the tightness ratio θ .  
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Figure 1. The wage bargaining result, BB, and the profit maximising real wage, MM, determine the real wage 
and the tightness ratio in the upper right quadrant. This implies a solution for the unemployment rate u and 
vacancies v in the lower right quadrant. Each result for wages implies a result for hiring costs in the upper left 
quadrant.   
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i I am grateful to Steven Brakman, Michael Br￿uninger, Georg G￿tz, Henri de Groot, Karin Kamp, 
Gerald Nekker, Erik de Regt, Johannes Schneider, Bas ter Weel, Gerd Weinrich and Seminar 




ii Subsections are titled as in Pissarides 1990. The search part is explained in greater detail there. 
iii Pissarides (1998, p.167, footnote 15) refers to estimates of the matching function using a Cob-
Douglas functional form, which justifies the assumptions made in the text. 
iv Policy and financing constraints are discussed more extensively in Pissarides (2000), Chap.9. 
v By implication we only consider the case of a large number of firms in which no strategic behaviour 
takes place. 
vi Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.435, fn. 5) also follow this procedure.  
vii See Pissarides (2000), section 3.4 for this interpretation.  
viii In Pissarides (1990) this leads to the zero-profit condition f(k) - (r+δ )k  - w ￿ (r + s)γ / q(θ ) = 0. Here 
f(k) is the output per unit of labour and δ  is the rate of depreciation.  
ix This equation corresponds to equation 3.2 in Pissarides (2000). 
x Equation (4) corresponds to equation (3.7) in Pissarides (2000).  
xi This result corresponds to equation 1.18 in Pissarides 1990. Note that with β =1, the negotiation result 
would require V=J=γ /q=γ /(m/v)=0, which could only hold for v=0 without additional assumptions on 
the matching function. However, with v=0 we also have θ =0 and therefore no vacancies and hiring 
costs. Equation (5) would imply that wages equal revenue per worker. 
xii This result corresponds to equation 1.19 in Pissarides 1990 or to equation 1.20 in Pissarides (2000).  
xiii Note that if the sum of all present-discounted profits is zero, in a steady state with all terms in the 
profit function constant - except for time in the discount factor ￿ it follows from carrying out the 
integration that current profits have to be zero.  
xiv This equation corresponds to equation (3.8) in Pissarides (2000), p.69. 
xv In Pissarides (2000) this equation corresponds to equation (1.9) there. 
xvi Dividing both sides by ￿a￿ and replacing the left-hand side by f(k)-(r+δ )k shows that this equation is 
essentially present already in Pissarides. We do not claim that it is new but rather it is modified to 
contain the degree of competition and it serves to solve for the tightness ratio.  
xvii To get a negative second derivative of the MC curve it is sufficient to assume that the matching 
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type. 
xviii See Kirchesch (2001) and the literature cited there for a recent contribution on this issue.   
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xix The impact on vacancies remains unclear here. Pissarides￿ result is achieved if the direct effect of an 
increase of s dominates.  
xx It is the formal analogue to the share of capital for a neo-classical production function f(k). 
xxi Using the properties of the matching function presented on the first page and Euler￿s theorem we 
















xxii Effects of changes in fixed costs may be quite different in endogenous growth models. See de Groot 
(2000)  
xxiii This result can also be found in the quality ladders literature (see Boone 2000, Aghion and Howitt 
1998). However, Boone￿s model is one of a partial equilibrium and in Aghion and Howitt each firm 
consists of one worker thus fixing firm size making employment equal to the number of firms. 
xxiv The number and size of firms then become indeterminate according to equations (2￿) and (7). 
xxv Bean and Pissarides (1993) show that it can be adjusted for use on short-run issues as well. 
xxvi Loveman and Sengenberger (1991, section V) also report the decrease in the trend concerning the 
size of firms. The decrease in fixed costs in our model can be associated as a short cut for ￿￿ the new 
bread of ￿flexible￿ capital ￿ and R&D ￿ less costly ￿ to small firms.￿ The authors present many 
more complementary arguments to explain the phenomenon. Liu and Yang emphasize transaction costs 
and Lordon (1997) emphasizes changes in taste to explain these phenomena.  
xxvii The papers by Vogt and Blanchard and Kiyotaki are of course monetary but the monetary part is 







                                                                                                                                                                      
Appendix: Household’s utility maximization (not for publication) 
The Hamiltonian for the dynamic optimisation problem of the household indicated in 
the text is 
  








































i i p c di c c λ
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α  for all goods i.  
 
λ ρλ λ r W − = − = ∂ Η ∂ − & / 
 




t e  need not be stated here 
because the differential equation for the co-state variable implies  r − = ρ λ ￿ . For any 
positive interest rate the transversality condition is redundant. The first-order 

















Therefore the inverse partial price elasticity is α -1. Multiplying the first-order 
conditions for ci by ci and summing over all goods yields 
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As all goods I the model have the same costs and therefore the same prices we set the 
prices equal to unity using them as numØraire. Quantities then also will be identical 
because goods enter the utility function symmetrically. The last equation then can be 
written as n
(1/α )-1 =λ . In any steady state where the number of firms is constant, the co-
state variable λ  must also be constant and its growth rate ρ -r must also be zero. 
Therefore r = ρ  in a steady sate with a constant number of firms.   
 
Appendix: Effects of changes in bargaining power and benefits on net wages (not 
for publication) 
 
The equations (4￿) and (5￿￿) can be rewritten in the following way: 
 
w - α /a + γ (r + s)/q(θ ) = 0 
 
w - (1-β )z - β (α /a + θγ ) = 0 
 





























































Cramer￿s rule yields (with D= -βγ -(r+s)γ q
-2 (-1)q￿ <0): 
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D q q s r a z w / ’ ) 1 ( ) )( / ( /
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The first expression has the sign of the curly brackets, which contains the value of the 
decrease of expected rents minus that of the increase of the unemployment rate 
multiplied by benefits z. If the increase in the rate of unemployment is lower (higher) 
than that of the decrease in rents, net wages can be increased (decreased) because the 
increase in taxes reduces the increase in gross wages only to a small extent. The  
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second expression is negative if (sufficient) the change in unemployment dominates 
the change in rents.  
 
Appendix: The impact of the marginal revenue on the number of firms (not for 
publication) 
The change in the number of firms ￿ignoring hiring costs - is dn = [-L(1-u)/f] dα  - 
[L(1-α )/f]du  with 
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The last equality uses results from the previous appendix. Insertion of du into the 
definition of dn yields: 
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For the last step we have made use of the fact that (i) in zero-profit equilibrium α /(1-
α ) = a/f, the ratio of marginal to fixed costs or the measure of scale economies, and of  
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the fact that (ii) the last expression in square brackets is the negative value of the 
elasticity of employment in regards to monopoly power α . By implication, an increase 
in monopoly power dα <0 increases (decreases) the number of firms if the measure of 
scale economies is larger (smaller) than the elasticity of employment with respect to 
monopoly power.   
 
 
List of symbols (not for publication) 
α   marginal revenue, CES parameter  
a   marginal costs   
β   bargaining power  
γ   hiring costs 
f   fixed costs     
L   country size   
n  number of firms  
nx  aggregate output  
r   interest rate     
s   separation rate 
t  unemployment premium or tax  
θ  tightness ratio v/u  
u unemployment  rate.   
v   vacancy rate  
w   wage   
x   firm size in terms of output quantity 
y   utility  
z   unemployment benefit 